We study credible information transmission by a benevolent short-lived central bank. We consider two possibilities: direct revelation through an announcement, versus indirect transmission through monetary policy. We show that, in the presence of externalities creating a wedge between private and social welfare, the central bank prefers to mis-report its information in some cases. Private investors then might rationally ignore announcements by the central bank. In contrast, information transmission through changes in the interest rate creates a distortion, thus lending an amount of credibility. This induces private investors to rationally take into account information revealed through monetary policy.
Introduction
How can a central bank e¤ectively communicate its information about economic fundamentals to the private sector? What is the role of monetary policy as a tool for information revelation in the presence of aggregate risk and of potential coordination problems faced by investors? Why do central banks typically follow policies that lead to positive average levels of in ‡ation? These questions are highly topical and have a long history in monetary economics. However, decisive answers still elude us. This paper studies monetary policy as a tool for credible information transmission by the central bank. 1 We build a model that contains the following three ingredients: (1) money plays a role in facilitating trade, (2) there is aggregate risk about fundamentals, and (3) investment decisions are subject to a coordination problem, implying that individually optimal decisions might not maximize aggregate welfare. Investors in our economy have expectations about economic fundamentals that a¤ect investment returns. A benevolent central bank (CB) has the ability to print money and to provide loans. In addition, the CB has its own information about the true state of the economic fundamentals. We demonstrate that this information cannot always be credibly transmitted to the private sector. In other words, a simple announcement might not be enough, as the CB may prefer to communicate false information if this would lead to more socially desirable behavior by investors. We then show that credible information revelation is possible through monetary policy. In order to 1 There is a large literature on optimal monetary policy in the presence of information frictions. See, for example, Weiss (1980) and Barro and Gordon (1983) for two related early models. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) emphasize the role of ambiguity for central bank policies. Kydland and Prescott (1977) introduce the famous dynamic inconsistency problem. Backus and Dri¢ ll (1985) introduce uncertainty about the central bank's type (see also King, Lu and Pasten, 2008) . Our approach di¤ers in several ways from these papers. Perhaps the most important one is that we concentrate on the role of monetary policy as a credible information transmission mechanism in a model that does not rely on reputation building by a long-lived central bank (see also Phelps, 1983 , for the importance of central bank credibility in managing expectations). For a recent model that studies credible information transmission by the central bank, but without explicitly modelling money or monetary policy, see Moscarini (2007) . Ellingsen and Söderström (2001) study the e¤ects of monetary policy on the yield curve and document that when monetary policy reveals information about economic fundamentals, interest rates of all maturities move in the same direction as the policy innovation. In this paper, we provide an explanation of why information is revealed through monetary policy instead of announcements. Our paper is also related to Amador and Weill (2007) , who study the e¤ects of releasing public information in a Lucas (1972) environment. They show that releasing public information about aggregate fundamentals can lead to greater uncertainty. gain credibility, however, it is necessary that such a policy create a distortion by a¤ecting average in ‡ation. The study of optimal monetary policy in our framework concerns the optimal balancing of the resulting bene…ts from information revelation against the costs associated with the monetary distortion. More generally, monetary policy in our model can be thought of as the "translation" of the central bank's information, expressed by the corresponding value of the chosen interest rate. Absent the need for information transmission, the benevolent central bank would always set the nominal interest rate to zero. Thus, positive nominal interest rates serve as a way for the central bank to credibly transmit its "message" to the private sector. Since interest rates a¤ect economic fundamentals, this information transmission gains the necessary element of credibility that would be missing in a pure announcement. 2 One episode that motivates our analysis concerns the events that took place in Sweden during the period [2005] [2006] [2007] . These events strongly suggest the need for a central bank to supplement its words with deeds. During that period, the Swedish Central bank (the Riksbank) was carefully monitoring the growth of housing prices in Sweden. Concerns about the rapid rise in these prices were repeatedly expressed publicly by the Riksbank. In 2005, concerns about house prices appear in six out of seven press releases that follow monetary policy decisions, as well as in the Financial Stability Report. 3 However, the rise in housing prices continued throughout 2005, reaching 10% in the third quarter of 2005 compared to the same quarter in the previous year. 4 According to the minutes of the Executive Board's monetary policy meeting of December 2005, it was suggested that raising the repo rate by 25 basis points "would also function as a signal that could subdue house price trends and household indebtedness."From January 2006 onward, the Riksbank started gradually raising interest rates. In the corresponding announcements of monetary policy decisions, this rise was complemented by stressing the concern over housing price developments. According to 2 Needless to say, monetary policy in the actual economy serves several purposes. In order to concentrate on monetary policy's role as a credible communication device, we will abstract from e¤ects related to liquidity provision. For a recent paper that studies the credibility of central bank policies in a di¤erent context, see Ennis and Keister (2007) . 3 The Riksbank changed the interest rate only once in 2005: a 0.50 percentage point cut in June. 4 Moreover, the average annual growth rate of housing prices was about 7.5% between 1996 and 2005. Household borrowing showed a similar average rate of increase in this time period. the minutes of December 2006, while the rate of price increases and borrowing remained high, some slowdown had already taken place. 5 Our reading of these events is that the interest rate increases added credibility to simple announcements by the Riksbank, thus …nally changing the behavior of the private sector. This was a task that repeated previous announcements alone had failed to accomplish.
Throughout the paper, we study the e¢ cient and credible ways for a CB to communicate its information to private investors. Motivated by the Swedish experience, we consider two possibilities. First, the CB makes a direct "announcement." For example, one could think of a press statement or an interview delivered, say, by the chairman of the CB. Alternatively, the CB may indirectly transmit its information through monetary policy, i.e., through varying the nominal interest rate. Our main …nding is that these two ways of transmitting information can have very di¤erent consequences. Whenever the objectives of the benevolent CB and that of an individual investor in the economy are not directly aligned, we
show that the CB might have an incentive to misrepresent its information if this would lead to private investment decisions that improve social welfare. The private investors might, in turn, rationally choose to ignore such announcements. In contrast, credible information transmission through changes in the interest rate is not "cheap-talk," as it reduces welfare through creating a distortion associated with a violation of the Friedman rule. We demonstrate that, provided that the costs associated with in ‡ation are su¢ ciently high, this adds a necessary amount of credibility that induces the private investors to rationally take into account the information provided by the CB. At the same time, social welfare is higher than in the absence of credible information transmission.
There is an ongoing debate in macroeconomics about whether the CB should react to the developments in …nancial markets that are considered excessive, and that can lead to suboptimal investment decisions. In particular, the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy in affecting investors' choices is often questioned. The argument is that to induce a change in investors'behavior, a corresponding change in the interest rate would have to be very large.
This would have a negative impact on the real economy, thus more than outweighing the bene…ts of improved resource allocation. Our analysis suggests a new channel through which potentially modest interest rate changes can have a signi…cant impact.
Finally, our analysis o¤ers a novel reason why the CB may want to deviate from the Friedman rule as the optimal monetary policy. De ‡ation at the rate of time preference, also known as the Friedman rule, has proven to be a very robust optimal monetary policy in many monetary environments. The reason is that it is di¢ cult to …nd frictions that justify in ‡ation. 6 In our set-up, the CB wants to in ‡ate in order to convey its information credibly.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environment and con- 
The Environment
Our basic model uses the set-up developed by Berentsen and Monnet (2008) . They, in turn, build on Lagos and Wright (2005) . Other choices of a monetary model are also consistent with our …ndings. Our choice was for a tractable model in which to study information transmission by the central bank and where money is essential. Indeed, our model can be easily converted to a cash-in-advance economy.
Time t = 0; 1; :::, is in…nite. The economy consists of a continuum of in…nitely lived agents. In addition, there is a benevolent central bank (CB) that has the ability to make public announcements, to print money, and to make loans to the private sector. The CB serves for one term only and is replaced by a new CB at the end of each period. 7 6 Bhattacharya, Haslag, Martin and Singh (2008) show that agents' heterogeneity can explain why the Friedman rule is suboptimal, while Sanches and Williamson (2010) and He, Huang and Wright (2008) show that money theft can explain why some in ‡ation is optimal. 7 This feature allows us to abstract from reputation e¤ects, which, as we mentioned before, have been the focus of study in other papers. In the case of a long-lived CB, truthful information transmission can be assured if (su¢ ciently patient) investors trigger a severe penalty when they discover that the CB has miscommunicated its information. Our analysis focuses on achieving credible truthful communication in the absence of such reputation e¤ects.
good, k, a stage-1 good, q, and a stage-2 good, z. Investment takes place in stage 0 of each period. The market for good q opens in stage 1. In stage 2, investment pays o¤ in units of good z. Future periods are discounted at rate 2 (0; 1). There is no discounting between stages. We consider each stage in more detail next.
In stage 0 of each period, half of the agents are randomly chosen to be producers (investors). The remaining 1 2 proportion of agents become consumers. Each investor i chooses how much of an investment good, k, to produce. The utility cost to investor i from producing
gate production of the investment good and 2 ( 1; 1). Thus, investors costs are subject to an externality for any 6 = 0. The cost is zero if k i = 0. All investments mature in stage 2. The return on this investment is uncertain and is given by 2 units of good z per unit of k, where is a random variable with an improper uniform prior on ( 1; +1) and is iid across periods. Nature draws at the start of stage 0. We should remark that we consider the return on investment to be 2 instead of simply in order to guarantee that investment is always positive. In our formulation with 2 (0; 1), the externality is essentially the same as in Angeletos and Pavan (2004) since the individual return on investment also increases in the aggregate level of investment. 8 The random variable is our way of introducing aggregate risk about the pro…tability of investment, a feature that can be traced back at least to Keynes (1936) . Some information regarding this risk is available in the economy. More precisely, when the true state is , the CB receives a signal y = + , while all investors receives a signal x = + ". These signals are received in stage 0 of each period, prior to the investment decisions, and are iid across time. 9 We assume that the noise terms and " are normally distributed with mean zero and respective precisions given by = 1= 2 and = 1=
2 " . The assumption that investors 8 To see this, notice that we can write the pro…t from investment as
Assuming that investors' signals are perfectly correlated is for simplicity only. Stages 0 and 1 are interchangeable in what follows. What is important is that the CB's announcement/interest rate choice takes place prior to the investment decision by the private sector. For simplicity, we will assume that only investors (not consumers) receive signals. Morris and Shin (2002) use a similar signalling structure to study the trade-o¤ created by increasing the quality of the information held by the CB.
have some available information about the future pro…tability of their investments seems natural. In addition, CBs employ large numbers of specialists in order to collect and analyze economic data. The fact that these data is treated with secrecy suggests that CBs consider the information in their possession important and that they care about how and when this information is revealed to the public. Notice that we do not take a stand on whether the CB or the private investors have more accurate information.
In stage 1, investors can produce the stage-1 good, q, at a cost c (q) = q. The remaining agents (consumers) can consume q, deriving utility u (q), where u is increasing, concave, and satis…es the usual Inada conditions. In particular, there is a unique q such that u 0 (q ) = 1.
Good q is sold in a competitive market at price p. The sequence of events in each stage is summarized in …gure 1 below.
The Full-Information Benchmark
Throughout the paper we explore e¢ cient ways for the CB to communicate its information to private investors. Such information revelation is potentially bene…cial for two reasons. Market for good q opens. Good q is traded in exchange for money.
Agents can borrow at the lending facility of the CB at the interest rate r 0. 12 Second, the CB takes into account the social cost of investment, which may lead to a better allocation due to the presence of the externality. However, as we shall see, a simple announcement might not be enough, as there are cases where the CB would prefer to communicate false information. Later we will demonstrate that credible information revelation is possible through monetary policy.
Before we study these issues, we introduce the full-information economy as a benchmark.
Aggregate period-t welfare, W, is given by
where K = Z k i di is the aggregate production of the investment good in stage 0. Imposing that k i = K, the …rst-order conditions for the full-information e¢ cient allocation (q ; K ) in any given period yield u 0 (q ) = 1, and (2)
The amount of good z produced in stage 2 is indeterminate.
As investors are not readily identi…able during stage 1, some type of record-keeping is needed for transactions to take place. Next, we discuss how full-information e¢ cient allocations can be decentralized through monetary trade. We assume that money is provided exclusively by the CB. We let M denote the per capita supply of money and we let denote the real price of money in terms of good z. The growth rate of money is given by . Monetary injections are implemented through a transfer, T , in the settlement stage. The net stock of money grows according to M + = M + T , where subscript + is used to denote next period values and where T is such that M + = M . We consider a stationary equilibrium where
We use W (k; m; l; ) to denote the discounted lifetime utility of an agent when he enters stage 2 holding k units of the investment good, m units of money, and l units of loans from the CB, given that the realized productivity shock is . The function V (m) denotes the expected discounted lifetime utility from entering stage 0 with money holdings m. Then,
where z denotes the net production of the stage-2 good and E is the expectation operator over the possible realization of + . The …rst-order and envelope conditions give
The discounted lifetime utility of agents entering stage 1 with m units of money is 13 The following expression uses the fact that producers never borrow from the CB.
Using (5), the …rst-order conditions for investors are p = 1, and (7)
Since k i = k = K for all agents, the equilibrium aggregate production of the investment good under full information is given by K = 2 = (1 ). Using (3), observe that we have K < K whenever 0 < < 1, K = K whenever = 0 and K > K whenever < 0.
Hence, whenever 6 = 0, the equilibrium level of production is di¤erent from the level that maximizes aggregate welfare, K , as agents do not internalize the e¤ects of their decisions on others. For example, whenever < 0, an agent does not take into account that an increase in his production will increase the production cost for all other agents. Therefore, agents produce too much relative to the e¢ cient amount and K > K . The reverse is true when
The …rst-order conditions for consumers are
where is the real Lagrange multiplier on their budget constraint. Using (5) and (7) in (10) we obtain that = r. Then, (9) becomes
Consumers equalize the bene…t of consumption with the marginal cost of borrowing at the CB. Hence, monetary policy a¤ects the equilibrium allocation through this borrowing channel. Given r, a stationary equilibrium outcome is described by a vector q; fk i g i2[0;1] satisfying (8) and (11) . Finally, the envelope condition gives the rate of in ‡ation , consistent with the interest rate policy rule:
Using (2) and (11) it follows that, when the true value of is publicly observable, the CB follows the Friedman rule. It sets r = 0 for all states and u 0 (q ) = 1. Still the CB does not achieve the e¢ cient allocation as (3) is not satis…ed.
Information Transmission by the Central Bank
We now turn to the case where the aggregate state of the economy, , is unknown. Both the private sector and the CB receive informative signals regarding the true value of . The private sector receives signal x with precision . The CB receives signal y with precision .
Suppose the CB reveals that its signal is y a and that the precision of the signal is a .
The decision by the private sector is then given by
Using (5), the …rst-order conditions for investors are p = 1, and (14) k (x; y a ; a ) = E 2 + K j x; y a ; a :
Since all investors have the same information, we concentrate on symmetric outcomes where they all produce the same amount, k (x; y a ; a ) = K (x; y a ; a ). Hence,
Taking as given the behavior by the private sector, the CB maximizes expected period-t welfare given its signal, y, and precision, . This is given by
Since the CB's signal contains information about the true value of , it might be bene…cial if this information reaches the private sector. How should the CB transmit its information to the investors? We will consider two possibilities. First, the CB could make a direct "announcement." For example, one could think of a press statement or an interview delivered, say, by the chairman of the CB. Alternatively, the CB could indirectly transmit its information through monetary policy, i.e., through the interest rate, r. The main …nding of our paper is that these two ways of transmitting information can have very di¤erent consequences. Recall that the objective of the benevolent CB and that of an individual investor in the economy are not always aligned. Hence, the CB might have an incentive to misrepresent its information if it believes that this will lead to private investment decisions that improve expected social welfare. Realizing this, the investors might choose to ignore such announcements. In contrast, transmission through changes in the interest rate is not "cheap-talk,"as it reduces welfare through creating a distortion associated with a violation of the Friedman
rule. We will demonstrate that this adds a su¢ cient amount of "credibility"that can induce the investors to rationally take into account the information provided by the CB.
Public Announcements
For simplicity, we assume that the precision of the CB's signal, , is iid across periods and that it can take on two values: f L ; H g, where L = H " for some " > 0. The probability that = L is denoted by , and the probability that = H by 1 . The realization of the CB's signal precision is observed only by the CB. To further simplify the analysis, we will assume that y is publicly observable. In this case, the public announcement (which is not necessarily truthful) concerns only the value of CB's con…dence in its information. We denote such announcement when the realized precision is by a ( ). " > 0 such that the CB prefers to under-report its precision; i.e.
there is an " > 0 such that the CB prefers to over-report
and (c) if = 0, the CB reports the truth, i.e.
The Proof is given in the Appendix. The intuition is as follows. Notice that, given its announcement a , the CB expects the following aggregate level of investment
so that it is decreasing with a for all y. Intuitively, when 2 (0; 1), announcing a lower precision increases the expected return on the investment good, and therefore the individual investment decisions. This brings the aggregate investment level, K, closer to the socially optimum (recall that, due to the externality, equilibrium production of the investment good is lower than the full-information optimum level). Similarly, when < 0, over-reporting the truth depresses both the individual and aggregate investment decisions, bringing K closer to the optimum. Finally, when there is no externality, the CB prefers to reveal its information truthfully as in this case the private incentives are aligned with the social ones.
In addition, the bigger the wedge between social and private welfare (the higher the level of the externality j j), the higher is the CB's incentive to lie (@ 2 W= (@ a @ ) < 0). On the other hand, the CB's incentive to lie decreases as the precision of the private signal increases
Example 1 : To gain more intuition, we consider a special case where = 0 and 2 (0; 1).
Suppose further that 2 f L ; 1g, so that the CB knows the true productivity some of the time. Given the private signal has no precision, agents will choose to ignore it and use the public signal y and the announced precision a to form expectations. Then, K ( a ; ; y) is given by K ( a ; ; y) = E 2 j a ; ; y
When the CB gets the signal = 1, it knows that = y, so that the social optimum is K = y 2 = (1 ) 2 (by 3). However, if the CB reports a = = 1, agents will invest too little as they choose K = y 2 = (1 ). To boost investment, the CB prefers to lie and announce instead a = (1 ) = ( y 2 ). In this case the CB would be able to achieve the social optimum. While the CB is restricted to choose between L and 1, it is clear that it will prefer to announce L whenever it is close enough to a . (2)). On the other hand, if the CB reports a = 50, welfare increases to 2EW(q; k i j = 60; a = 50; y = 0:1) = u (q ) q + 0:7592 10 3 . Thus, the CB with = 60 prefers to announce a = 50 and follow the Friedman rule; i.e., set r ( a ) = 0. Consider = 0:1. The welfare under truth-telling when = 50 is 2EW(q; k i j = a = 50; y = 0:1) = u (q ) q + 0:6705 10 3 , where q denotes the consumption level at the Friedman rule (see equation (2)). On the other hand, if the CB reports a = 60, welfare increases to 2EW(q; k i j = 50; a = 60; y = 0:1) = u (q ) q + 0:6767 10 3 . Thus, the CB with = 50 prefers to announce a = 60 and follow the Friedman rule; i.e., set r ( a ) = 0.
To summarize, the benevolent CB might have an incentive to misrepresent its con…dence in its information. This raises the question of whether it is possible for the CB to use a costly method in order to credibly communicate its con…dence. We investigate this next.
Credible Monetary Policy
We continue assuming that the value of the CB's signal, y, is known and that its precision, , is iid across periods. For simplicity, we assume that the precision can take on two values: The CB chooses an interest rate rule to reveal the precision of its signal, i.e., r ( ). In contrast to a press announcement, the choice of r involves a deviation from the Friedman rule. Thus, it creates a distortion in the economy. At the same time, by "inverting" r, investors can infer the value of that the CB wishes to communicate. 16 The question is whether, unlike in the case of a pure announcement, information transmission through monetary policy can lead to an equilibrium where the CB reports truthfully and the private sector takes this information into account when making investment decisions.
The problem of the CB is to maximize (17) subject to the equilibrium equations of agents 14 and 15. In addition, in order for monetary policy to credibly transmit information about the CB's con…dence, a set of incentive compatibility constraints must hold. More precisely, we require that EW(q; Kjr ( ) ; ) EW(q; Kjr ( a ) ; ), for a 6 = .
In words, the resulting welfare must be higher under truthful revelation by the CB. Consider the case where in any given period, the CB with = H prefers to mimic the CB with = L , L < H (this would be the case under the conditions in Proposition 1 for > 0;
the < 0 case is analogous). Clearly, the incentive compatibility constraint in this case does not bind if = L . However, when = H , the CB has an incentive to misrepresent its con…dence in its information. Thus, the incentive compatibility constraint must bind
Setting r ( H ) = 0, we can obtain the corresponding interest rate, r ( L ), implicitly as the solution to
We must also verify that
i.e., in ‡ating in order to truthfully reveal that = L is preferred by the CB to the alternative of not in ‡ating and announcing = H . In addition, when = L , the CB must prefer the corresponding outcome to the case where there is no information revelation (and hence no in ‡ationary distortion) and where investors simply use their priors
We thus need to ensure that the welfare when the CB chooses an interest rate that reveals the true state exceeds the welfare that results if the CB simply follows the Friedman rule and investors use their priors, i.e.,
where r ( ) = 0. If (21) holds and is small enough, this condition will be satis…ed. Hence, we have the following result.
Analogously to the previous section, a symmetric equilibrium consists of actions by the CB and the private sector, (r; k), and beliefs for the CB and the private sector, 
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Example 1 (continued):
Consider again the case where = 0, 2 (0; 1) and 2 f L ; 1g.
In this case, we know the CB wants to under-report its precision. Therefore, r (1) = 0, while b r = r ( L ) > 0 must hold to discourage mis-reporting. In particular, the lowest credible interest rate satis…es the following constraint
When = 0, welfare is simply given by
Using this expression in (23) and simplifying, we obtain an implicit function for b r, where
Recall that the CB wants to lie when L is su¢ ciently close to (1
Equation (24) determines the interest rate b r that the CB will charge when it announces L .
Notice that the interest rate will also be increasing in the CB'productivity signal y 2 . Indeed, the incentives of the CB to misreport are greater when the realized y is higher. The reason is that the discrepancy between the private level of investment and the social optimal one increases with y. Finally, it is interesting to notice that (24) cannot be satis…ed when < 0 and when L is too small relative to y. This is intuitive: when < 0, the CB actually wants to lie upward and not downward, so that this is not the relevant constraint to consider.
When L is too small relative to y, the CB will prefer to tell the truth as otherwise it biases agents toward choosing a level of investment which is too low.
Example 2 (continued):
To show that need not be in…nitesimal for the result to hold, we consider the following example. Let ( L = 50) = 0:5, and …x the other parameter values to be those in the previous example.
Consider …rst = 0:1. We know that a CB with = 60 has an incentive to report a = 50. The question is whether a CB with = 50 prefers to costly but credibly communicate the true value of its precision. 17 To prevent a CB with = 60 from communicating the value = 50, the CB must invoke a cost, b r > 0, where b r solves (20) . For the parameter values above, b r is the solution to
where q denotes consumption level at the Friedman rule. Since this di¤erence is positive, such an b r exists. To see whether a CB with = 50 chooses credible but costly communication we …rst check that the welfare under costly communication is higher than the welfare under 17 Note that a CB with = 50 su¤ers a welfare loss if it cannot reveal its type truthfully and, instead, it is believed to be a CB with = 60: 2W(k i ; Kj = 50; a = 60; y = 0:1) =u (q ) q + 0:9780 10 3 < W(k i ; Kj = a = 50; y = 0:1) =u (q ) q + 0:1002 10 2 :
following the Friedman rule and being taken for an = 60 type: Now take = 0:1. In this case, it is a CB with = 50 that has an incentive to report a = 60. At the same time, a CB with = 60 su¤ers a welfare loss if it cannot reveal its type truthfully and, instead, it is believed to be a CB with = 50. 18 To prevent a CB with = 50 from communicating the value = 60, the CB must invoke a cost, b r > 0, where b r solves (20) . For the parameter values above, b r is the solution to
Since this di¤erence is positive, such an b r exists. We also check that the welfare under costly communication is higher than the welfare under following the Friedman rule and being taken for an = 50 type: Taken together, the two Propositions imply that a public announcement alone may not be e¤ective. In order to transmit information to investors, the CB must violate the Friedman rule. 19 In fact, incentive constraints put a lower bound on the in ‡ation level that must be tolerated in order for the information transmission to be credible. Otherwise, like a simple announcement, investors will rationally ignore the supplied information, treating it as "cheap-talk." 20 How high is the interest rate increase needed to ensure credible information transmission?
This question is related to the ongoing debate about the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy in containing developments in the …nancial sector. Should the CB react if it believes that "…nancial imbalances" are building up? One common argument against a monetary policy reaction is that the size of the interest rate adjustment that would be necessary to bring about a change in investors'behavior would have to be so large that it would generate too much harm to the real economy. As our approach considers explicitly the costs and bene…ts of credible information transmission, it might prove useful in evaluating the magnitude of the interest rate change that is needed for the CB to a¤ect investment decisions and to improve the resulting equilibrium allocation.
For a numerical example, assume a constant relative risk aversion utility function, i.e.,
, where ! is the coe¢ cient of the relative risk aversion. For ! = 2 and = 19 The conditions in the two Propositions above jointly hold for an open set of parameter values. Notice that in ‡ation rates below the Friedman rule are not consistent with the existence of a monetary equilibrium. Thus, in order to communicate its information credibly, the CB must choose a positive r, thus creating a costly distortion in the economy. 20 If an announcement by the CB is su¢ cient to credibly convey its information, in ‡ationary equilibria cannot exist. The reason is that at any positive in ‡ation level the CB can increase social welfare by further lowering in ‡ation. 
Conclusion
We introduced a model in which the CB has some information about the true state of the economic fundamentals (not necessarily better than private agents). Whenever the objectives of the benevolent CB and that of individual investors are not directly aligned, the CB has an incentive to misrepresent its information to improve social welfare. We investigated under what conditions the CB can credibly communicate its information to the private sector.
Our main …nding identi…es monetary policy as a tool that can lead to credible information transmission. While other ways to costly communicate information (e.g., taxes) are possible, 21 By applying the Implicit Function Theorem to equation (20) .
CBs around the world are restricted in terms of the policy instruments they can use. A costly monetary distortion can accomplish this information transmission. In other words, in ‡ation adds a su¢ cient amount of "credibility," thus inducing investors to rationally take into account the information provided by the CB.
One might be tempted to think of ways for the CB to communicate information while avoiding the welfare losses due to in ‡ation. 22 However, any such alternative will (by construction) lack credibility in the presence of externalities. It is precisely the real cost of the monetary distortion that lends credibility and, as a result, makes this channel of information transmission work in our set-up.
Our approach can be used to derive other properties of optimal monetary policy. For example, the model can be used to quantify the size of the monetary policy response needed to induce investors to take the CB's information into account when making their investment decisions.
22 Two ideas that have been suggested to us are (1) repeated interest rate announcements by the CB (that might cancel each other's e¤ects), and (2) variations in the timing of the decisions by the CB and by the investors.
Appendix -Derivation of welfare and proofs
Derivation of welfare: The objective of the CB is to maximize:
The CB takes it as given that investors produce the same amount, k i = K, given by (16).
Thus, we have
Using (16) we obtain:
Since E " k j ; y = E (" j ; y) E k j ; y = 0 for any k, the above expression simpli…es to
where we have used that E [" 2 j ; y] = 1= . Hence, we have
Next, we use the following expressions in order to compute E [K 2 j ; y]. Thus,
algebra, we obtain:
Thus, expected welfare is given by:
For 6 = 0 and 6 = 0, evaluating this expression at = a yields:
In particular, for 6 = 0, announcing = a is not optimal. Moreover, for 2 (0; 1), we obtain @ @ a W(q; k i ) j = a < 0, and if the CB believes that investors will use its announcement, it prefers to announce an a that is lower than the true . If < 0, then which implies that the marginal bene…t of announcing a is increasing in the CB's type.
Notice that W ( a ; ; y) = u (q) q + F ( a ; ; y) :
Since u 0 (q) = 1 + r ( a ), the derivative of u (q) q is independent of the CB's type so that
Therefore, the single crossing property is satis…ed whenever
In the case where there are two possible precisions, L and H , the single crossing property implies:
Evaluated at a = L , this is the condition we are checking.
The …rst-order derivative of the expected welfare with respect to a ,
, is given in (36). We have that
where we wrote H as L + ". By continuity, for " su¢ ciently small, this expression is also negative. By (38), we are checking that
The above expression is given by: 
Note that since " > 0, this expression is positive. Turning to the investors, since the truthful information revealed by the CB is useful in this case, it is a best response for investors to use this information.
An equivalence result: Here we demonstrate how the CB can in principle use monetary policy in order to convey both the realized value of its signal and its con…dence in the signal through manipulating the interest rate. We consider again the case where the precision of the CB's signal, , can take on two values: f L ; H g, where L < H . The probability that = L is denoted by . As before, the CB receives a signal y about the value of .
The CB also knows the realization of the precision of its signal, . It can choose to convey the value of y and to the private sector through monetary policy. This can be accomplished via a rule that takes the following form:
with g (y; ) = 0, if the CB does not reveal its information in state (y; ). Can the CB use monetary policy in order to reveal its information about both its signal and that signal's precision? To give an a¢ rmative answer, we need to demonstrate that there exists a homeomorphism between these two sets.
Since the CB needs to signal both y and to the private sector, it must be the case that g (y; L ) 6 = g (y 0 
is a homeomorphism. 
